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SEPARATIONISM TO THE EXTREME: THE MT. SOLEDAD
CROSS AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S CRUSADE TO BURDEN
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Cameron M. Rountree*
INTRODUCTION
The morning transit southbound on Interstate Five or a leisurely drive through the
glittering streets of La Jolla reveal to the keen observer a prominent and unmistakable
symbol of religious faith. To be sure, the object of attention drawing accolade, criti-
cism, and legal consternation alike is a highly contentious Latin cross. Standing forty-
three feet tall,' atop a bluff of 822 feet,2 the Mt. Soledad Cross serves as a veterans'
memorial, icon of faith, and controversial symbol of government endorsement of
religion. Despite the varied array of opinions elicited by the existence of the twenty-
four ton reinforced concrete religious structure,3 on once public property,4 the builder
of the cross holds the enhancement and preservation of the memorial, and education
of the public to the sacrifices of veterans in preserving American freedoms, as its
mission.5 Although the present cross was erected in 1954, its predecessors date
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2009; B.A., University of Virginia, 2002. I would
like to thank: my family for providing the direction, my friends for the diversion, Virginia
for the education, and San Diego for the inspiration.
1 Murphy v. Bilbray (Murphy I), 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1422 n.2 (S.D. Cal. 1991), cert.
denied sub nor. County of San Diego v. Murphy, 512 U.S. 1220 (1994), and cert. denied
sub nom. City of San Diego v. Paulson, 513 U.S. 925 (1994).
2 Mount Soledad Memorial Association, About the Memorial, http://www.soledadmemorial
.com/web/pages/about the memorial.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
3 Murphy I, 782 F. Supp. at 1422 n.2.
4 At the initiation of the dispute, the cross stood upon the Mt. Soledad Natural Park, a
park publicly owned by the City of San Diego. Philip Paulson, Crossing Mount Soledad, THE
HUMANIST, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 22. As a result of the litigation, the City attempted to sell
portions of the park on two occasions. Id. at 24. First, in 1994 a 224-square-foot segment was
sold to the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association. Id. In the second instance, in 1998, the City
sold a 22,172-square-foot portion, again to the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association. Paulson
v. City of San Diego (Paulson 1), 262 F.3d 885,890 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 294 F.3d
1124 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and cert. denied sub nom. Mt. Soledad
Mem'l Ass'n Inc. v. Paulson, 538 U.S. 978 (2003).
' Mount Soledad Memorial Association, About the Memorial, supra note 2. The Mt.
Soledad Memorial Association was given permission by the City of San Diego to place a
replacement cross (the current cross) on Mt. Soledad in 1954. Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990
F.2d 1518, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nor. County of San Diego v. Murphy, 512
U.S. 1220 (1994), andcert. deniedsub nom. City of San Diego v. Paulson, 513 U.S. 925 (1994).
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to 1913, making it a well-known landmark in San Diego County.6 Despite the
cross's long history, however, it has not always received favorable attention. For
nearly the last twenty years, the cross has been a matter of intense debate; namely
a long and costly legal battle initiated by an offended atheist and U.S. Army veteran,
Philip Paulson.7
During the extensive litigation many decisions held in Paulson's favor, seemingly
tolling the death knell for the cross's continued existence on Mt. Soledad. While
most of the judgments rested on sound, well-articulated legal principles, 9 the Ninth
Circuit's holdings have left constitutionally questionable repercussions in their wake.'°
Particularly, the ramifications on the free exercise rights of the cross's owner, the
Mt. Soledad Memorial Association (MSMA), as a result of the court's ruling that the
sale of the city property beneath the cross to the MSMA constituted impermissible
state aid to a religious organization." To be sure, it is not argued, nor has it been in
seventeen years, that it would be constitutional the MSMA to maintain a sectarian
symbol atop the city property. 2 The issue was never addressed, however, as to whether
the Ninth Circuit's prohibition of selling the property to the MSMA, in an open and
objective bidding process, infringed on the organization's right to participate in public
discussion and demonstrate its faith. This Note seeks to examine the protracted liti-
gation surrounding the Mt. Soledad Cross and the Ninth Circuit's persistent refusal
to allow the MSMA to compete in the marketplace of expression on Mt. Soledad.
6 Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1521. The first cross to appear on Mt. Soledad was made of redwood
and was placed by private individuals in 1913. Id. The original cross was destroyed by vandals
in 1923 and replaced by one of wood and stucco in 1934. Id. The second cross was destroyed
in a wind storm in 1952 and ultimately replaced by the present cross. Id.
7 See Paulson v. City of San Diego, No. 89-0820GT (LSP), 2007 WL 1756030, at *5 (S.D.
Cal. Jun. 15, 2007) (awarding legal fees to plaintiff Paulson in the amount of $962,691.28);
Paulson, supra note 4, at 22-23.
s See generally Paulson v. City of San Diego (Paulson II), 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (barring the sale of the property under the Mt. Soledad Cross as a form of promoting
religious purposes), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and cert. denied sub nom. Mt. Soledad
Mem'l Ass'n, Inc. v. Paulson, 538 U.S. 978 (2003); Ellis, 990 F.2d 1518 (upholding the
Murphy I decision and enjoining the presence of a Latin cross on official city insignia); Paulson
v. City of San Diego, No. 89-0820GT, 2006 WL 3656149 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (ordering enforce-
ment of the injunction within ninety days as a result of the Paulson If ruling); Murphy v.
Bilbray (Murphy II), Nos. 90-134 GT, 89-820GT, 1997 WL 754604 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (ordering
the enforcement of the original Murphy I injunction); Murphy I, 782 F. Supp. 1420 (holding
that the presence of two crosses on public property violated the California Constitution's no
preference clause).
9 Paulson H,294 F.3d 1124 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (entering the unpublished opinion
of the Ninth Circuit panel, which originally ruled on the appeal); Murphy II, 1997 WL 754604;
Murphy I, 782 F. Supp. 1420.
'0 Paulson H, 294 F.3d 1124.
Id. at 1131.
12 See Murphy 1, 782 F. Supp. 1420.
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In short, this Note argues two main points. First, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly inter-
preted California state law with respect to state-sanctioned religious preference and
religious aid. And, second, in doing so, the Ninth Circuit neglected to consider the
free exercise ramifications of its ruling. Part I lays out the intricate facts and history
of the long, contentious legal battle and discusses the history of the cross, its litigation,
and similar contemporaneous disputes. Part II breaks down the analysis of the various
courts' decisions in the Mt. Soledad case, and focuses on similar religion decisions
by the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. With those
approaches in mind, the Note highlights the flaws of the Ninth Circuit's decision and
suggests a more neutral outcome to the socially and politically difficult issues surround-
ing free exercise and establishment. Lastly, the Note concludes by discussing recent
decisions in the field and suggests an approach to dealing with similar, inevitable
future cases.
Though it may appear the court's disposition in the cross controversy was a clear
matter of reinforcing the wall separating church and state, the ancillary issue implicat-
ing federal free exercise rights was mistreated by the court.13 Although the Ninth
Circuit rested its separationist-favoring decisions on the California Constitution, the
California Supreme Court has interpreted the state's highest law in a far less stringent
manner, affording more objective treatment to religious practice.14 Furthermore, in
relying solely on state law and refusing to treat the federal issue, the court failed to
properly consider the ramification of its decision on the federally protected right to
the free exercise of religion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY: THE TEMPEST BEGINS
The majority of decisions in the string of cases involving the cross have rested on
well-reasoned legal analysis, open to political criticism perhaps, yet built upon funda-
mentally fair principles of law.15 Still, in June 2002 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
chose to overrule its own panel's decision regarding the sale of public property to
the MSMA and, by doing so, entered the divisive battleground pitting church against
state. 16 This intrusion resulted in an unsettling state of the law with respect to religious
freedom in the Ninth Circuit.
The saga began on May 31, 1989, when plaintiff Philip Paulson filed suit against
the City of San Diego with the goal of removing the Mt. Soledad Cross from public
13 Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 77, 80 (2007) ("We will suggest that the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, at least as applied recently, allows government
to erode religious freedom because the Court fails to recognize how government acts affect
individuals.").
"4 See, e.g., E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13 P.2d 1122 (Cal. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 1008 (2001).
"5 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16 Paulson II, 294 F.3d 1124.
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property." According to Paulson, when he first drove up the mount's steep and
windy roads eleven years earlier, he was shocked to see "an unmistakable symbol
of the Christian religion displayed on government property."'" Paulson, an avowed
atheist and Vietnam veteran viewed the fight as an issue of equal treatment under the
law."9 To Paulson, the display of the cross was like a neon sign on San Diego's
highest point "offering free advertising to the Christian religion. ' '20 The cross, he be-
lieved, excluded all non-Christian veterans and violated the Federal and California
Constitutions. 2' As a result, he and co-plaintiff Howard Kreisner commenced the
action, conducting all the legal research and writing on their own, and presenting the
case in court without the aid of legal counsel.22
Paulson and Kreisner's case was combined with two other cross challenges in San
Diego County at the time.23 The first involved a similar concrete cross displayed on
nearby Mt. Helix; the second concerned the insignia of the City of La Mesa found
on its police, animal control, and firefighting uniforms as well as police vehicles and
official city literature.24
After quickly addressing the issue of the plaintiffs' standing, District Court Judge
Gordon Thompson, Jr., ruled on the merits of the case in the first of many hearings
over which he would preside.2" In ruling for the plaintiffs in the consolidated three-
case decision, Judge Thompson found the crosses' presence on public property was
a violation of California's no preference clause26 and, so, saw no need to address the
"7 Paulson, supra note 4.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 25. Although raised in a strict Lutheran household, Paulson attributed his atheist
beliefs to three formative events. Id. at 23. The first was a scolding as a child by a summer
bible school pastor, second was witnessing the deaths of his comrades in Vietnam, and lastly,
the influence of his Sociology of Religion professor at the University of Wisconsin. Id.
20 Id. at 25.
21 Id. at 24.
22 Id. at 23.
23 Murphy v. Bilbray (Murphy 1), 782 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. Cal. 1991), cert. denied sub
nom. County of San Diego v. Murphy, 512 U.S. 1220 (1994), and cert. denied sub nom. City
of San Diego v. Paulson, 513 U.S. 925 (1994).
24 Id. at 1424. It is interesting to note the plaintiffs in the Mt. Helix Cross case and the
La Mesa city insignia case were a Catholic and a religious Episcopalian respectively. Id. at
1424-25. The latter plaintiff was "deeply offended by the expenditure of taxes for insignias
depicting a religious symbol" and would not invite business clients to his home for fear of
offending them, or embarrassing himself. Id. at 1425.
25 Id. at 1426. Referring to United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973), the court found that the plaintiffs had suffered an
injury, the beneficial use of a public park, "sufficiently direct to confer standing." Murphy I,
782 F. Supp. at 1426.
26 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4:
Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or
preference are guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse
acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
[Vol. 17:925928
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matter under other provisions of the California or United States Constitutions.27
Bound by the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the no preference clause as expressed
in Hewitt v. Joyner,21 the district court held that the California cases29 established a
violation of the no preference clause whenever a government body "so much as
appears to be preferring one religion over another or others."3 ° In making such a deter-
mination of preference, the court concluded the following factors may be considered:
"1. the religious significance of the item(s) challenged in the display; 2. The size and
visibility of the display and of the item(s) in it; 3. Whether the display includes any
comparably significant item(s) of other religions; and 4. The historical background
of the item(s) included in the display." 3 1
Applying these factors to the case, the court concluded that the cross was a
"powerful sectarian symbol," with a "commanding presence," absent "comparable
symbols of other religions," with no historical mitigation of the sectarian signifi-
cance.32 In fact, the court went on to add that history reinforced the sectarian signifi-
cance of the cross. 33 Indeed, the only visible representation that the cross site was a
war memorial was a plaque dated November 11, 1989, six months after the suit had
been filed by Paulson and Kreisner.3 As such, Judge Thompson deemed the com-
memorative purpose argument put forward by the city as pretext and permanently
enjoined the city from maintaining the cross on public property.35
The order notwithstanding, the court, in a suggestive parting shot, added the
comment that "[w]ere the parcels of land atop which the Mt. Helix and Mt. Soledad
crosses presently stand privately rather than publicly owned, then these cases would
State. The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion.
A person is not incompetent to be a witness or juror because of his or
her opinions on religious beliefs.
27 Murphy 1, 782 F. Supp. at 1427.
28 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992).
29 See Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792 (1978) (holding that illuminating a
Latin cross at Christmas and Easter and failing to recognize the symbols or holidays of other
religions demonstrated an unconstitutional preference). But see Okrand v. City of Los Angeles,
254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Ct. App. 1989) (allowing the display of an unlit menorah alongside a
Christmas tree in the city hall rotunda).
30 Murphy I, 782 F. Supp. at 1428.
31 Id. at 1429.
32 Id. at 1436.
" Id. The cross was dedicated in 1954 at an Easter Sunday religious service. Ellis v. City
of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. County of San Diego
v. Murphy, 512 U.S. 1220 (1994), and cert. denied sub nom. City of San Diego v. Paulson,
513 U.S. 925 (1994). Prior to the litigation, the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association obtained
a permit to conduct a sunrise service on Easter Morning each year. Id. The cross is known
locally as the "Soledad Easter Cross." Id.
3 Paulson, supra note 4, at 24. November 11 th is Veteran's Day.
3 Murphy 1, 782 F. Supp. at 1438.
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be entirely different."36 In effect, the penultimate paragraph of the decision charted
the course the city would pursue, prolonged the disposition of the controversy, and
provided the breeding ground for the Ninth Circuit to eventually encroach upon the
MSMA's free exercise rights.
On appeal from the district court, the Ninth Circuit addressed, for the first time,
the city's concern that a federal court ought to abstain from an unclear matter of state
law.37 Despite the presentation of an alternative route to dodge the unseemly area of
California establishment law, the court relied on the availability of its interpretation
of the no preference clause in Hewitt38 and the California Supreme Court's decision
in Sands v. Morongo Unified School District to resolve the matter.39 In affirming the
district court's opinion, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the reasoning of Judge Thompson
but explicitly refused to comment on whether sectarian war memorials violated the
Constitution.n° By avoiding the federal issue at this point, although in keeping with
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,41 the court missed its first opportunity
to address the possible repercussions of its decision creating an environment hostile
to the MSMA's First Amendment free exercise rights.42 This was particularly impor-
tant due to the court's acknowledgment that the city voted to authorize the sale of a
fifteen-foot square parcel of land under the cross to the MSMA, in the interim, since
the verdict in the original case.43 After the Supreme Court denied the city's writ of
certiorari,' the property was sold to the MSMA in October 1994 for $14,500. 41
36 id.
" Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1522.
38 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992).
'9 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991) (prohibiting the school district from including benedictions
and invocations at high school graduation ceremonies and relying on the three-prong Lemon
test established by the Supreme Court as well as the California Constitution), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1218 (1992).
40 Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528. This is especially interesting to note considering the Oregon
Supreme Court's position on the matter. See Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene,
558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976) (en banc) (permitting the display of a large cross in a public park as
a veterans war memorial), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
41 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
42 Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts,
87 CAL. L. REv. 1409, 1418 (1999) ("Siler thus established that federal court adjudication of
state-law issues was not only permissible in federal question cases, but indeed was preferable
if it allowed the court to avoid a federal constitutional question.").
41 Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528. However, the conveyance had not yet taken place, and the court
held that the impact of the future sale had no bearing on the validity of the injunction being
argued and would have to be heard by the trial court. Id. at 1529. The total area of the land
to be sold was approximately 222 square feet. Jason Marques, Note, To Bear a Cross: The
Establishment Clause, Historic Preservation, and Eminent Domain Intersect at the Mt. Soledad
Veterans Memorial, 59 FLA. L. REV. 829, 835 (2007).
4 City of San Diego v. Paulson, 513 U.S. 925 (1994).
41 Murphy v. Bilbray (Murphy II), Nos. 90-134 GT, 89-820 GT, 1997 WL 754604, at *7
(S.D. Cal. 1997).
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Paulson subsequently filed a motion in district court to enforce the original injunc-
tion attacking the sale and its underlying purpose.'
Particularly troubling to Paulson were the amount of land sold and the method
of sale.47 In siding with the plaintiff, Judge Thompson agreed and stated that by enter-
ing into a negotiated sale with no other person or entity besides the MSMA, the city
gave the appearance of preferring the Christian religion over all others.48 The amount
of land sold and method of sale failed to "cure the constitutional infirmities outlined
in th[e] Court's previous Order.
49
Not to be outdone, the city again attempted to sell a portion of land under the cross
in 1998, presumably in a manner capable of satisfying Judge Thompson's "constitu-
tional infirmities" highlighted in the order enforcing the original injunction. 50 This
time the sale was open and well publicized and the amount of land had increased a
hundred fold to just over one half an acre.5" The result was the sale of the land to the
MSMA for $106,000, the highest bid.5 2 Unlike the city's previous attempt, this sale
included serious offers from the Horizon Christian Fellowship, Saint Vincent De Paul
Management, the MSMA, and even pro-separation organizations such as the National
League for the Separation of Church and State, and the Freedom From Religion
Foundation.5 3 Paulson, still dissatisfied with the transfer, challenged the conveyance
in district court anew.54 This time, however, Judge Thompson declared the motion
moot, ruling the sale constitutional in that the method, amount of land sold, and the
proposed improvements to be made by the MSMA substantially divested the city of the
appearance of preference.5 5 Paulson promptly appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challeng-
ing his first unfavorable decision on the grounds that the structured bidding process
gave the MSMA an advantage and that the amount of land sold was still insufficient
to eliminate the appearance of city endorsement of religion.56
"' Marques, supra note 43, at 835.
41 Murphy II, 1997 WL 754604, at *9. The land was sold under a city council policy which
authorized the negotiated sale of city owned property at fair market value to qualified non-
profit organizations where there was "a development commitment and a right to repurchase
or reversion upon a condition subsequent." Id. at *8.
48 Id. at *10. Additionally, Judge Thompson lamented the fact that the stated intent of
Proposition F, the city-wide initiative to sell the property, was to "SAVE THE CROSS ON
MOUNT SOLEDAD." Id.
49 Id. at *11.
'0 Paulson, supra note 4, at 24.
5 Marques, supra note 43, at 836.
52 Paulson v. City of San Diego (Paulson 1), 262 F.3d 885,890 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en
banc, 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and cert. denied sub
nom. Mt. Soledad Mem'l Ass'n, Inc. v. Paulson, 538 U.S. 978 (2003).
" Marques, supra note 43, at 836.
54 Id. at 837.
" Paulson I, 262 F.3d at 890.
56 Id. at 891.
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As a threshold matter, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit addressed
whether the California no preference clause was more protective of separation prin-
ciples than the Federal Constitution." In reviewing the California Supreme Court's
case law on the matter,5 8 the court determined that if the government action satisfied
the Lemon test,59 which was used in challenges to the Establishment Clause of the
Federal Constitution, there was no need to apply the no preference clause.6° In other
words, the Ninth Circuit panel interpreted the California Supreme Court's holdings
as meaning application of both the Lemon test and the no preference clause was
redundant. The court then addressed Paulson's specific claims.
First, Paulson asserted that the City's solicitation for bids, which included a
use restriction that required the maintenance of a war memorial and considered the
bidders' experience in maintaining a war memorial, was structured to give prefer-
ence to the MSMA. 61 In determining that the structured bidding was not an uncon-
stitutional preference, the court referred to evidence that religious and secular groups
had equal opportunity to purchase the land and stated that a public sale was a common
and effective way for a public body to dispose of its inappropriate endorsement of
religion.62 The MSMA was the highest bidder and despite Paulson's contention that
considering the bidder's experience in maintaining a war memorial was improper, the
court held otherwise, in fact applauding that logical criterion.63
Perhaps what is most intriguing about the panel's decision was the fact that it
was the only court up to that time to base its decision on federal law. 64 To determine
whether the sale was constitutional, the court implemented the venerable Lemon
test.65 First, with respect to the sale, the court held there was clearly a secular pur-
pose, namely ending the inappropriate state endorsement of religion. 6 Second, the
principal effect neither advanced nor inhibited religion because the sale did not prefer
or discriminate against religion.67 Lastly, excessive entanglement with religion was
57 Id.
58 See E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13 P.2d 1122 (Cal. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 1008 (2001). Clearly East Bay was not decided at the time Judge Thompson ruled
on the issues in Murphy I.
" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion."' (citations omitted)).
'o Paulson I, 262 F.3d at 891.
6 Id. at 891-92.
62 Id. at 892-93. "The bidding process was structured with explicit factors considered
consistently for every bid." Id. at 893.
63 Id. at 892.
64 Id. at 893-94.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 893-94.
67 Id.
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not fostered because the state provided no aid as it sought the highest bidder with the
best qualifications under the enumerated factors.68
Still, the most noteworthy aspect of the panel's well-reasoned and comprehensive
opinion was the acknowledgment that an over-expansive reading of the Establishment
Clause could have detrimental repercussions on the ability of private property owners
to display religious symbols on their land.69 If this acknowledgment had been treated
by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, the possibility exists that the dilution, or at best
uncertainty, regarding free exercise rights would not remain as a result of the circuit
court's decision. Although this was a sustained victory for the city and the MSMA,
the celebration was short lived, as a majority of the Ninth Circuit's regularly active
judges granted Paulson a rehearing of the panel's decision.7 °
Unlike the two previous tribunals, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, took a
different approach to analyzing the cross controversy. Instead of relying on the no
preference clause, or the Establishment Clause, the court assessed the sale under
article XVI, section five of the California Constitution. 71 The text of the provision
mandates that
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, town-
ship, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever
make an appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever, or
grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or
sectarian purpose, or help to support or sustain any school, col-
lege, university, hospital, or other institution controlled by any
religious creed, church, or sectarian denomination whatever; nor
shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever
be made by the state, or any city, city and county, town, or other
municipal corporation for any religious creed, church, or sectarian
purpose whatever; provided, that nothing in this section shall
prevent the Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section 3 of
Article XVI.
72
As the court acknowledged, "It is possible for the government's transfer of
'anything' to violate the provision if the transfer is 'in aid of any 'sectarian purpose.'
Therefore, all forms of governmental 'aid' are subject to scrutiny. 73 Thus, the court
68 Id.
69 Id. at 896 (citing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
768 (1995)).
70 Paulson v. City of San Diego, 281 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2002).
" Paulson v. City of San Diego (Paulson I1), 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and cert. denied sub nom. Mt. Soledad Mem'l Ass'n, Inc.
v. Paulson, 538 U.S. 978 (2003).
72 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
73 Paulson H, 294 F.3d at 1129; see also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G.
SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTrrUTION 24 (2007). Eisgruber and Sager ruminate:
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embarked on a voyage of California case law to determine what article XVI, section
five prohibited. 71 In reaching its decision, the court held that the constitutional pro-
vision prevented "granting a benefit in any form... to any sectarian purpose...
regardless of the government's secular purpose ... unless the benefit [was] properly
characterized as indirect, remote, or incidental."75 Notably, the court, en banc, consis-
tent with Siler, avoided the federal issue and the Lemon test the panel had employed
to resolve whether the state action violated the Federal Constitution.76 In reaching
its ultimate conclusion, the court reviewed the facts of the bid solicitation: the cross
would be conveyed to the purchaser, the purchaser needed to be able to maintain a
war memorial, and the highest bid and the bidder's financial security were also con-
sidered in evaluating a successful bid.77 Consequently, the court reasoned, "To those
potential buyers who wanted to preserve the cross or convey its message, the City
gave away for free an economically valuable means of fulfilling the main condition
of the sale. 78 Put differently, the court believed that by conveying the cross, it made
it easier for those who wished to keep it to win the bid, therefore preferring religion.
On the other hand, a secular bidder who wanted to construct a memorial without the
cross "would be saddled with the costs of removing the cross and of constructing an
alternative memorial. 79  Finally, the court concluded by stating that since the
method of sale was in violation of article XVI, section five, there was no need to
address the matter under the no preference clause or Establishment Clause. °
Yet, the "neither aid nor hinder" formula is deeply problematic, demand-
ing treatment of religion that is anything but equal. On the one hand,
government routinely aids many important projects and commitments
of its citizens-why else would we want government? But if we take
the 'no aid' principle seriously, religious projects and commitments must
be deprived of the aid that these other endeavors receive.
Id.
14 Paulson II, 294 F.3d at 1130-31; see E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13
P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000) (allowing exceptions to state landmark preservation statutes for noncom-
mercial religious property), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1008 (2001). But cf. Cal. Teachers Ass'n v.
Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981) (barring a state-wide program to loan textbooks to children in
non-profit, nonpublic schools); Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Philibosian, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 918 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a violation can occur when the state lends its power
and prestige to a sectarian purpose), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); County of Los Angeles
v. Hollinger, 34 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Ct. App. 1963) (barring the county from purchasing video
coverage of a Christian holiday parade even if the purpose was to promote tourism and
commerce); Frohlinger v. Richardson, 218 P. 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923) (barring public aid for
restoration of historical California Missions if the result lends aid to a sectarian purpose).
71 Paulson II, 294 F.3d at 1131.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1132.
78 id.
79 id.
go Id. at 1133 n.7.
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Again the City appealed to the Supreme Court, only to be denied a hearing for
the second time in fourteen years." It was seemingly inevitable that the cross would
be removed from the property. Nevertheless, in 2006, while sitting in his capacity
as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy granted an emergency stay
of Judge Thompson's renewed order to remove the cross until all appeals had been
settled.82 Meanwhile, Congressmen Duncan Hunter, Brian Bilbray, and Darrell Issa
pushed through H.R. 5683, which called for the U.S. government to acquire and pre-
serve the memorial.83 The resolution passed the Senate on August 1, 2006, and was
finally signed by President Bush two weeks later.84 The cross was now effectively
in federal hands and Paulson's original challenge became moot. That fact notwith-
standing, the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit on behalf of the Jewish War
Veterans of the United States, challenging the federal government's ownership of the
religious display under the Establishment Clause. 5
I1. ANALYSIS
A. The Framework
As noted in Part I, the three different courts to review the case of the Mt. Soledad
Cross each applied different law in reaching their decisions.86 Although the facts
surrounding the legal question plainly varied at different phases of the lengthy liti-
gation, one factor was consistent at the outset and the disposition: The basis on which
both the district court and Ninth Circuit rested their opinions was the California
Constitution. In light of the varying provisions of the constitution relied upon by
the courts, the principal query remains: Did the Ninth Circuit impose an overly strict
81 Marisa Taylor & Ray Huard, Mount Soledad Cross Case Turned Down, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRm., Apr. 22, 2003, at Al.
82 Marques, supra note 43, at 842.
83 Id.; see also Paulson, supra note 4, at 26 (noting a vote total of 349-74).
8 Preservation of Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial, Pub. L. No. 109-272, 120 Stat. 770
(2006).
85 Marques, supra note 43, at 843.
86 See Paulson v. City of San Diego (Paulson II), 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(applying the state no preference clause and California Constitution article XVI, section five),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and cert. denied sub nom. Mt. Soledad Mem'l Ass'n, Inc.
v. Paulson, 538 U.S. 978 (2003); Paulson v. City of San Diego (Paulson 1), 262 F.3d 885 (9th
Cir. 2001) (applying the Federal Establishment Clause to the sale of property by a city to the
MSMA), rev'd en banc, 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and
cert. denied sub nom. Mt. Soledad Mem'l Ass'n, Inc. v. Paulson, 538 U.S. 978 (2003); Ellis v.
City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying the state no preference clause and
explicitly refusing to address federal issue), cert. denied sub nom. County of San Diego v.
Murphy, 512 U.S. 1220 (1994), and cert. denied sub nom. City of San Diego v. Paulson, 513
U.S. 925 (1994); Murphy v. Bilbray (Murphy 1), 782 F.Supp 1420 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (applying
the state no preference clause), cert. denied sub nom. County of San Diego v. Murphy, 512 U.S.
1220 (1994), and cert. denied sub nom. City of San Diego v. Paulson, 513 U.S. 925 (1994).
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mandate prohibiting any amount of intermingling between religion and government
in interpreting the no preference clause and article XVI, section five of the California
Constitution? Furthermore, as a result, did the court infringe upon the rights of the
MSMA to freely exercise its faith?
Given the assorted and flip-flopped legal bases for the rulings striking down or
upholding the sale of the city property, Sections B and C of this Part analyze the foun-
dational flaws of the Ninth Circuit's decision on grounds of California and federal law
respectively. If, indeed, the Ninth Circuit did not seek to burden the Free Exercise
Clause, what alternative approach could it have pursued in settling the matter of the
cross's presence? This task requires, at a minimum, an examination of the no pref-
erence clause, and article XVI, section five of the California Constitution, as well
as the Federal Establishment Clause. In other words, there exist two approaches, an
analysis of the sale under state law and an analysis under federal law, with the goal of
finding the least restrictive means of dissolving official public endorsement of religion
while keeping in mind the inalienability of free exercise rights.
Within this paradigm are four principal inquiries to address regarding the three
different constitutional provisions. What would be the effect on free exercise rights in
the Ninth Circuit if: (a) article XVI, section five was the only legal rule used; (b) the
no preference clause alone was the standard implemented in evaluating the sale; (c) a
combined Establishment Clause and no preference clause analysis was the model
used; or (d) the Federal Establishment Clause was the sole applicable criterion? The
effects of the first two standards of review are readily discernible and apparent in short
order, meanwhile the scrutiny regarding the latter two standards comprises the most
substantive criticism of the Ninth Circuit's legal rationale in denying the MSMA the
opportunity to purchase the public land under the Mt. Soledad Cross.
The conclusion suggests the Ninth Circuit acted in an overly sensitive manner to
claims of establishment with respect to the California Constitution, while at the same
time disregarding the far more permissive reading the Federal Constitution allows.
The result was an impermissible infringement on free exercise rights which should be
challenged under the Federal First Amendment.
In light of the implied infringement of free exercise rights, Section D of this analy-
sis illustrates the manner in which such rights are commonly offended and gives a
brief overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the field. Lastly, predictions as
to the viability of the MSMA's potential First Amendment claim are discussed along
with the future of free exercise rights and religious symbols in the United States.
B. California Law
1. Article XVI, Section Five
a. Prohibition on Funds in Aid of a Religious Purpose
[Vol. 17:925
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If the decision invalidating the cross's sale is assessed under article XVI, sec-
tion five, the impact on free exercise rights in cases factually similar to Paulson is
damaging. This is true, not necessarily because the court's logic in applying the
California Constitution to the facts is overly persuasive, but because the decision left
a binding federal precedent on a matter of state establishment law." To recall, the court
claimed that article XVI, section five prevented "granting a benefit in any form...
to any sectarian purpose... regardless of the government's secular purpose... unless
the benefit [was] properly characterized as indirect, remote, or incidental."8 The Ninth
Circuit's interpretation explicitly forbade providing any benefit to a sectarian organi-
zation such as the MSMA; however, since the court relied on state law, a California
explanation as to what equated to a benefit was necessary.89
b. What Is a Benefit?
In fact, two years prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Paulson, the California
Supreme Court reiterated its finding from California Educational Facilities Authority
v. Priest" in East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. California when it defined
the scope of article XVI, section five as forbidding not just the appropriation or pay-
ment of public funds to support sectarian institutions, but also "any official involve-
ment whatever its form, which ha[d] the direct, immediate, and substantial effect of
promoting religious purposes."9' To its credit, in the Mt. Soledad case, the Ninth
Circuit appropriately abided by the California Supreme Court's common law inter-
pretation in Paulson.92
In East Bay, despite the California court's ostensibly liberal interpretation of what
constituted undue aid for a sectarian purpose, it did, nevertheless, grant a religious
organization a benefit unavailable to secular groups.9" Specifically, the court con-
cluded that no provision of the Federal or California Constitution was violated by the
exemption from local landmark preservation laws for noncommercial property owned
87 Paulson 11, 294 F.3d 1124.
8 Id. at 1131.
89 See E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 1008 (2001).
90 526 P.2d 513,522 n.12 (Cal. 1974).
' East Bay, 1-3 P.3d at 1140 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in East Bay were secular
nonprofit organizations requesting injunctive and declaratory relief, challenging the constitu-
tionality of an amendment to Government Code Section 25373, which had the effect of grant-
ing an exemption from landmark preservation laws to noncommercial property owned by a
religious organization if the organization would suffer substantial hardship if the property
were so designated. Id. at 1126.
92 Paulson 11, 294 F.3d at 1133 n.7.
9' East Bay, 13 P.3d at 1140.
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by religious organizations.' As the appellate court reasoned, the exemption simply
left the property in the condition it otherwise occupied. 95 In other words, even if the
religious organization were not required to comply with the landmark preservation
designation, the court reasoned this was acceptable because no additional value was
conferred upon the property through the statutory exemption.
Still, the court acknowledged, "While there may be a benefit as compared to
other properties that are subjected to landmark designation, neither the state nor the
local governmental entity expends funds, or provides any monetary support, for the
exempted property or its owner." 96 Quite surprisingly, the court unmistakably diluted,
if not eviscerated, the expansive interpretation approach to article XVI, section five
by conceding that a relative benefit conferred to a religious group would not be a
violation of the state constitution, so long as there was no expending of funds, or pro-
viding monetary support on the part of the state.97 Nor was this line of reasoning
unforeseeable.
Twelve years earlier, in a similar California appellate case involving a long-term
lease of surplus community college property to a Jewish congregation, the court
adopted the opinion that article XVI, section five was never interpreted to require
governmental hostility towards religion, nor to prohibit a religious institution from
receiving an indirect, remote, and incidental benefit from a statute which has a secular
primary purpose.98 After the California courts made clear a benefit could be granted
to a religious entity, the Ninth Circuit obfuscated the issue.
c. Application to Paulson
With these cases in mind, then, it is not hard to draw a parallel to the facts of
Paulson. Recalling that the challenged bidding process was struck down by the Ninth
Circuit because it provided a financial enticement to maintain the cross,99 it is difficult
to justify how unrestricted land use did not provide a similar, if not more lucrative,
incentive to the religious organizations affected by landmark preservation in East




97 Id. But 4 Paulson II, 294 F.3d at 1131 (permitting a benefit only if it could be properly
characterized as indirect, remote, or incidental).
98 Woodland Hills Homeowner's Org. v. L. A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 266 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990).
9 Paulson II, 294 F.3d at 1132.
'0 Consider the case of St. Bartholomew's, an Episcopal church in Manhattan in the 1980s
that wanted to tear down a seven-story community house in order to construct a forty-plus-
story office building. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 73, at 25 (2007). Professors Eisgruber
and Sager qualify the church's request as, "an extraordinary and special benefit, measured by
the economic value of being exempt from land use restrictions that would otherwise apply to
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munity property owners in proximity to religious property, it is striking that the Ninth
Circuit found it unacceptable to disadvantage those who bid on the property but did
not desire to maintain the cross as part of the memorial.
Undeniably, there are factual distinctions between East Bay and Paulson; how-
ever, the disparity in what amounted to religious aid between the state and federal
courts is stark. While the Ninth Circuit interpreted article XVI, section five as pro-
hibiting anything having the direct, immediate, or substantial effect of promoting a
religious purpose,'0 ' the California Supreme Court retreated from such a steadfast
position and acknowledged that some aid, at least in the form of statutory exemptions
and incidental benefits, was permissible.' 2 In this regard, at least, it must be sug-
gested that the Ninth Circuit decision invalidating the second sale of the city property
to the MSMA was incorrect insofar as it deemed an incidental benefit to be one that
was available on an equal basis to those with sectarian as well as those with secular
objectives. 10 3 The California cases simply do not bear this out.
2. No Preference Clause
a. Why Dodge the No Preference Clause Reasoning?
Continuing to look at state law, if the proposition that the no preference clause
alone should have been the guiding principle in analyzing the cross's sale then many
questions remain as to the status of free exercise rights in the Ninth Circuit. In effect,
since the federal circuit court decided to ignore the no preference clause in its ulti-
mate decision, the case of the Mt. Soledad Cross is unremarkable with respect to this
constitutional provision.l°4 Although the court definitively disagreed with the outcome
of the original Ninth Circuit panel's decision and Judge Thompson's dismissal of
Paulson's motion to enforce the injunction, the opinion did not expressly overrule the
it." Id. at 26.
O' Paulson II, 294 F.3d at 1131.
102 East Bay, 13 P.2d at 1134. This is additionally noteworthy due to the distinction between
the facts of Paulson and East Bay, which impacted free exercise rights, and those of Cal.
Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981), in which the California Supreme Court
struck down the state's (largely symbolic) aid to religious organizations, but in which there was
no restraining impact on free exercise rights. See also Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc.
v. Philibosian, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985);
County of Los Angeles v. Hollinger, 34 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Ct. App. 1963); Frohlinger v.
Richardson, 218 P. 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923).
103 See Paulson H, 294 F.3d at 1131.
"o4 See id. at 1133 n.7 ("Because we hold that the method of sale violated article XVI,
section 5, we do not reach Plaintiff's argument under article I, section 4, of the California
Constitution or under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and we express
no view on those questions.").
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analysis that both other courts applied to the facts of the second sale to the MSMA.° 5
Instead, by invoking de novo review as the result of an abuse of discretion on the part
of the district court, the circuit court made an end-run around Judge Thompson's
decision on the merits as previously and consistently viewed through the lens of the
no preference clause."°
But why did the Ninth Circuit evade the legal framework that the lower court
time and again applied in evaluating the "constitutional infirmities" of the sale to the
MSMA? If the Ninth Circuit was not out to burden the free exercise rights of the
MSMA, what was the compelling legal rationale to decide the case outside the confines
of the no preference clause as the district court and circuit court panel had before?' °7
In fact, the California cases suggested a disposition much more favorable to the MSMA
and in keeping with the lower court decision on no preference clause grounds.
To begin, consider again East Bay, in which the California Supreme Court, a mere
two years previous to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Paulson, declared that it "never
had occasion to definitively" interpret the no preference clause, but went on to say,
"[n]either the history nor the language of the no-preference clause supports plaintiffs'
argument that the clause bans governmental accommodation of religion or religious
belief in general."' 18 In disposing of the alleged state constitutional violation, the court
relied on its parallel interpretation of preference, or discrimination, based on the Lemon
test and declared that the landmark exemption was constitutionally permissible. l°
Despite the fact that the California Supreme Court admitted it had not interpreted
the no preference clause up to, and beyond, East Bay in 2000, the Ninth Circuit
ironically saw fit to define the scope of the California constitutional provision nine
105 Id.
106 See id. at 1128-29 ("The district court thus made an error of law (and consequently
abused its discretion) when it failed to analyze separately the requirements of article XVI,
section 5."). Interestingly, while the Ninth Circuit assailed the district court for abusing its
discretion, it had previously stated, "Any issues concerning compliance with the injunction
should be decided in the first instance by the district court." Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d
1518, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied sub nom. County of San Diego v. Murphy, 512 U.S.
1220 (1994), and cert denied sub nom. City of San Diego v. Paulson, 513 U.S. 925 (1994).
Although explicitly suggesting wide latitude in the application of the injunction, the court with-
held guidance on what might decide the merits of the second sale. Id. See generally Robert J.
Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40
VAND. L. REv. 1023 (1987) (discussing whether courts of appeal should consider new issues
not addressed in lower courts).
107 See CATHARINE COOKSON, REGULATING RELIGION: THE COURTS AND THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE 28 (2001) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) as introducing
the "compelling state interest" test in balancing free exercise rights and the state's interest
in avoiding establishment).
"08 E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13 P.3d 1122, 1139 (Cal. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 1008 (2001).
109 Id.
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years earlier based on two religious symbol cases." 0 Relying on Fox v. City of Los
Angeles,"' and Okrand v. City of Los Angeles," 2 the Ninth Circuit, in Hewitt v.
Joyner, held that the no preference clause meant not only could a governmental body
not prefer one religion over another, but it could not even appear to be acting prefer-
entially.' 3 Judge Thompson, in deciding Murphy I, reduced the Hewitt, Fox, and
Okrand opinions to a set of four circumstances which tended to indicate unconstitu-
tional government preference."' It was this test, he felt, which was violated by the
presence of the cross on city property, but which was satisfied after the second sale." 5
In addition to the unnerving fact that the Ninth Circuit created a federal interpre-
tation of a state constitutional provision in advance of the state supreme court, it may
well have missed the mark. Considering the fact that the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that "[iun the California Constitution there is no requirement that each
religion always be represented,"'" 16 or that governmental aid to religion is not wholly
prohibited, 17 it seems that the Ninth Circuit recognized the frailty of its overreaching
Hewitt decision and sought to avoid the preference discussion all together.
b. No Preference Clause-More Bark Than Bite
It is also worth noting that constitutional proscription on state preference of
religion is perhaps far less prohibitive than it might appear and as routinely applied by
federal courts. The text of the California clause provides: "Free exercise and enjoy-
ment of religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This liberty
"' Murphy v. Bilbray (Murphy 1), 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1428 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (basing the
Ninth Circuit's no preference clause decision in Hewitt v. Joyner on Fox v. City of Los
Angeles and Okrand v. City of Los Angeles), cert. denied sub nom. County of San Diego v.
Murphy, 512 U.S. 1220 (1994), and cert. denied sub nom. City of San Diego v. Paulson, 513
U.S. 925 (1994).
"' 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978) (ruling that the illumination of a Latin cross alone, during
Christmas and Easter, was preferential when no comparable recognition of other religions
was practical).
112 254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding an unlit menorah salvaged from the
Holocaust and displayed in the City Hall rotunda with a Christmas tree was not an unconsti-
tutional exhibit of preference).
13 940 F.2d 1561, 1567 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that county ownership of a park that con-
tained religious statues depicting scenes from the New Testament was a violation of, inter alia,
the no preference clause), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992).
"' Murphy I, 782 F. Supp. at 1428-29. Among the inquiries to be made were, "1. the
religious significance of the item(s) challenged in the display; 2. The size and visibility of
the display and of the item(s) in it; 3. Whether the display includes any comparably significant
item(s) of other religions; and 4. The historical background of the item(s) included in the
display." Id.
"i ld. at 1436.
116 Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663, 665 (Cal. 1978).
"7 See Woodland Hills Homeowner's Org. v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 266 Cal. Rptr. 767
(Ct. App. 1990).
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of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion."" 8 Instead of barring state harmonization with religion, however,
"[a]ccording to the nonpreferentialist tradition, the religion clauses were designed
to foster a spirit of accommodation between religion and the state, as long as no single
church was officially established and governmental encouragement of religion did not
deny any citizen freedom of religious expression."" 9 To illustrate this point, "the use
of the indefinite article 'an,' rather than definite article 'the,' before 'establishment
of religion' indicates the drafters [of the First Amendment] were concerned with gov-
ernment favoritism toward one sect, rather than with favoritism of religion over non-
religion."'"2 This unique interpretation provides an interesting paradigm from which
to view the courts' decisions in Paulson. Still, the Ninth Circuit surprisingly managed
to avoid the preference debate all together.'
2
'
Effectively, therefore, Paulson put in jeopardy the stability of free exercise rights
in the Ninth Circuit under the no preference clause. By eluding the procedural
history of the case, upon which free exercise rights with regard to religious symbols
were previously structured, the circuit court ignored the standard it created in Hewitt
and attacked free exercise with a new arrow in its secular quiver.
C. Federal Law
1. Establishment and No Preference Clauses
a. Abstention and the Confusion That Ensued
Thus far, the decision of the Ninth Circuit in evaluating Paulson has been
analyzed from the perspective of California law, which, as demonstrated, presented
its own set of problems, namely the application of state law by a federal court. The
procedural difficulties are worth noting, however, and contribute significantly to the
negative repercussions on free exercise rights. If, on the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit had incorporated federal law in its decision-making process, then perhaps the
MSMA's free exercise rights would not have been mistreated. By the Ninth Circuit
disregarding the U.S. and California Supreme Courts' interpretations as to what consti-
tuted establishment and preference with respect to religious symbols, it deteriorated
fundamental free exercise rights.
To start, it is a widely held belief that federal courts ought to avoid deciding
federal constitutional questions when the alternative exists to dispose of a case on
.". CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
"9 Patrick M. Garry, The Myth of Separation: America's Historical Experience with Church
and State, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 475, 484 (2004).
120 Id.
.21 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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state law grounds. 122 As demonstrated, this can be challenging considering the degree
of discord or misunderstanding between a state's court of last resort and the federal
appeals court. 123 In fact, it has been suggested that federal courts might want to
avoid adjudicating state law claims, given the often non-authoritative character of a
federal court's opinion on state law. 24 Nevertheless, this is contrary to the approach
the Ninth Circuit took in deciding Paulson. Instead of addressing the federal claim,
the court first upheld the decision of the district court to permanently remove the cross
from city property on the grounds of the no preference clause,' 2' only later to strike
down the city's manner of doing so on the grounds of article XVI, section five.
126
Although "[a]djudicating the state claim furthers the policy of avoiding federal con-
stitutional questions, [it] presents the risk of federal intrusion into sensitive state
policies.' 121 Perhaps no better was this seen than through the interference of the Ninth
Circuit in the case of the MSMA and the cross.
While the court, no doubt, believed it was observing judicial economy in avoiding
the federal question, it misapplied a state constitutional provision without consultation
with the state supreme court. As a result, the MSMA' s free exercise rights were un-
duly implicated. 28 For example, as the overruled panel pointed out, although some
California courts had previously viewed the no preference clause as more protective
of separation principles, the California Supreme Court suggested otherwise in East
Bay.'29 At that point, the circuit court recognized that the U.S. Constitution is equally
or more restrictive than the no preference clause. 30 In its telling admission, the court
acknowledged its overly broad, separationist-favoring interpretation of the no prefer-
ence clause in Hewitt had given way to the California Supreme Court's more recent
discussion on the state's religion clauses.'
3
'
122 Schapiro, supra note 42, at 1413.
123 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
124 Schapiro, supra note 42, at 1413.
12 See Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1220
(1994), and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 925 (1994).
126 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
127 Schapiro, supra note 42, at 1411.
128 To be fair, as Professor Schapiro suggests, alternatives such as abstention, certification,
and declining supplemental jurisdiction are options federal courts may utilize in avoiding
unique aspects of state law, but they often substantially increase the cost, in time and money,
of a case's resolution. Id. at 1419-22.
129 Paulson v. City of San Diego (Paulson 1), 262 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2001) rev'den
banc, 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and cert. denied sub
nom. Mt. Soledad Mem'l Ass'n, Inc. v. Paulson, 538 U.S. 978 (2003).
130 Id. (holding California law as coinciding with the intent and purpose of the First
Amendment Establishment Clause and citing E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California,
13 P.3d 1122, 1139 (Cal. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1008 (2001)).
"'i Id. at n.4.
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Indeed, not only did the California Supreme Court concede that the no prefer-
ence clause was not more restrictive than the Establishment Clause, it did so in the
context of preserving free exercise rights, stating:
In guaranteeing free exercise of religion 'without discrimination
or preference,' the plain language of the clause suggests, however,
that the intent is to ensure that free exercise of religion is guaran-
teed regardless of the nature of the religious belief professed, and
that the state neither favors nor discriminates against religion.'32
In that case, in order to determine whether the exemption from landmark preservation
laws was an undue governmental preference for religion, the California Supreme
Court used the Lemon test.133 Likewise, the circuit court panel in Paulson I applied
the three prongs of Lemon and concluded that (a) the sale had a clearly secular pur-
pose of ending government endorsement of religion; (b) the bidding process did not
favor or discriminate against religion; and (c) the relationship which resulted between
the MSMA and the city from the sale was the natural consequence of the transaction
taking place and did not warrant the classification of an impermissible entanglement. 1
34
This line of reasoning should have concluded the matter. In order to resolve the
dispute, the circuit court's panel relied on the state supreme court's interpretation of
what preference meant with respect to establishment, which was the same meaning
as the Federal Constitution. 135 As if following a legal blueprint, the Ninth Circuit
panel identified a legal issue covered by state law, applied the state court's most recent
and topical interpretation, and came to the right conclusion.
To recap, first the district court determined the presence of the cross on city
property was a violation of the no preference clause of the California Constitution. 136
Second, the district court held the first sale of the city property to the MSMA was a
manifestation of preference. "' Third, the city and the MSMA rectified the constitu-
tional infirmities of the original sale. 138 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit, on wholly distin-
guishable grounds, decided the second sale, although satisfactory to the district court
and circuit court panel, was a violation of a different state constitutional provision. '39
132 East Bay, 13 P.3d at 1139.
133 id.
' Paulson I, 262 F.3d at 894.
3 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
38 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit rightfully
rationalized its article XVI, section five reasoning on the East Bay decision; yet it missed a
critical caveat to the constitutional provision, namely the California Supreme Court's conferral
of a relative financial benefit to a religious organization within the strictures of law. See supra
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The inconsistency in application of the law, as well as the failure to recognize the
potential implication of First Amendment rights if only a narrow interpretation of a
state constitutional provision was applied, are what must be criticized in addressing
whether the Ninth Circuit sought to saddle a new yoke to the free exercise rights of
the MSMA.
2. Establishment Clause
Evaluating the decision of the Ninth Circuit under the authority of California
law proves disheartening if for nothing else but the fact that the court seemingly
misapplied the state law.'4° Even with respect to both the no preference clause and
article XVI, section five, it appears a convincing legal basis existed to permit the
second sale of the city property to the MSMA. Furthermore, as suggested in the
section above, if California law was viewed as analogous to federal law, a more
expansive interpretation as to how free exercise rights were protected could be
demonstrated.14 ' Ironically, despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit desired to avoid
any federal questions in the series of litigation, it turned out that invoking California
law should only have served as a proxy for federal law since the California Supreme
Court made no distinction between the two on the establishment issue. 142 As a
result, then, what guidance had the federal courts provided concerning, establish-
ment, free exercise rights, and religious displays?
a. Lemon and Its Three Prongs
In the seminal case establishing the guiding principle to apply in cases offending
the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice Burger
described the historical purpose of the clause as removing the sovereign from the
"'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement"' in religious activity. 143 To
that end, the Court assessed whether two respective Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes which provided financial benefits to private religiously affiliated schools,
violated the newly adopted three-prong test.' 4 In determining that the state statutes
were unconstitutional, the Court relied on the third prong of the test, that is, the undue
entanglement between government and religion. 145 Notably, the Court stated, "Judicial
Part II.B. 1.
'" See supra Part II.B.1-2.
"4 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
14' 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
'44 Id. at 602; see supra note 58.
'41 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 ("[Fior we conclude that the cumulative impact of the entire
relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between
government and religion.").
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caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being
a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circum-
stances of a particular relationship."'" Specifically, the recognition that the evaluation
as to entanglement required a full assessment of the circumstances, absent a bright line
rule, was telling and suggested an open approach to analyzing alleged violations of
the Establishment Clause.
Just as the Supreme Court reasoned in Lemon, the Ninth Circuit Panel in Paulson
found: there was a secular purpose to the sale of the City property, religious and
secular groups had equal opportunity to purchase the land, and there was no inappro-
priate relationship resulting from the sale.'47 Thus, it appeared the panel's reasoning
was consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Lemon, and if this federal inter-
pretation of establishment was the standard the Ninth Circuit en banc chose to employ,
the second sale of the city property would likely have passed muster. Of course,
Lemon did not involve religious symbols, and was therefore more easily adjudged
as to whether the first two prongs were satisfied. Since in Paulson it was apparent
the sale fostered a secular purpose, that is, the desire to dissociate the cross from city
property, that fact deserves little attention. 4 8 On the other hand, whether the principal
purpose of the sale was to advance religion is a more debatable matter.
b. Purposeful Advancement and Justifications for Entanglement
In a more similar case to Paulson, the Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter held that the display of a creche in a courthouse
violated the Establishment Clause. 4 9 The Court reasoned that by engaging in a prac-
tice that had the effect of promoting or endorsing religious beliefs, the display of the
creche in the county courthouse had an "unconstitutional effect."'"5 Still, while
forbidding the display of the creche, the Court noted a possible exception in cases
where an accommodation could be made to unburden an organization's free exercise
rights. 151 Citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 152 the Court stated, "Government
efforts to accommodate religion are permissible when they remove burdens on the free
exercise of religion.' 5 The inflexible reasoning put forward by the Ninth Circuit-
146 id.
"' Paulson v. City of San Diego (Paulson 1), 262 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'den
banc, 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and cert. denied sub
nom. Mt. Soledad Mem'l Ass'n, Inc. v. Paulson, 538 U.S. 978 (2003).
148 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
149 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989).
150 Id.
15' Id. at 601.
152 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 n.51.
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that the sale was a benefit to a religious organization in violation of article XVI, sec-
tion five-notwithstanding, such benefit or accommodation was not wholly forbidden.
Allegheny implied, at least in some instances, that religious symbols may be permis-
sible if to remove them would burden free exercise rights. This was exactly the effect
of the Ninth Circuit's decision and what remains so disconcerting.
When viewed in this context, if the decision in Paulson were made under the
authority of strictly federal establishment law, it is difficult to see how the sale could
be rejected. Considering the sale passed constitutional muster under the Lemon test,
it is improbable that a ruling made on federal law would yield the same result as the
Ninth Circuit's misinterpretation of California law.
D. The Repercussions on Free Exercise
1. Opposing Clauses
The bifurcated nature of the Constitution's religion clauses presents a unique
cognitive symbiosis. 54 On the one hand, the Free Exercise Clause enshrines the right
of the individual to dissent from popular wisdom, and on the other, the Establishment
Clause limits the power of the majority to impose its religious preference on society.'"
Explicit in these complimenting guarantees is the freedom of the individual from the
many. To secure this safeguard in a reasonable manner it has been suggested, "the
Free Exercise Clause should protect anything that is 'arguably religious,' while the
Establishment Clause should not preclude government from engaging in activities that
are 'arguably not religious.'"1 6 This is particularly important because a narrow inter-
pretation of religion in the realm of free exercise poses the threat of under-inclusive
protection of religious minorities. 57 Conversely, definitions too broad with respect
to establishment risk the removal of government from a wide range of activities in-
cluding, education, social services, and recreation.158 The difficulty inherent in this
balance was at the heart of Paulson. What amount of city endorsement or aid was
too much? What rights were impacted by the Ninth Circuit's zeal to "dis"-establish?
The following summary is illustrative of commonly recognized violations of free
exercise rights and helps mark the ebb and flow in free exercise protection.
2. The Case History
'-5 BETrE Novrr EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: THE
CONSTrUTION AND AMERICAN PLURALISM 47 (1997).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
156 PAuL FINKLEMAN, RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 123 (2000).
157 One need only consider the chronicles of American religious minorities such as Jews,
Mormons, and Jehovah Witnesses.
158 EVANS, supra note 154; see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 73, at 80.
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Burdens on religious freedom come in many forms. From outright prohibition,
to the conditioning of government benefits on non-religious behavior, the ability to
sterilize faith from the public arena is pervasive.' 59 In the simplest, impermissible
case, an outright ban on religious exercise, the burden is often imposed due to the
objectionable nature of the practice in the face of the prevailing cultural and societal
norms."6 Yet often the denial of free exercise rights is far more subtle.16' In the past
fifty-five years, the courts and Congress have fluctuated over what triggers a burden. 1
62
As some suggest, courts have recently elevated the threshold harm required to suffice
as a burden of constitutional protection. 163 This has had the effect of allowing judges
to avoid the constitutional question.' 64 Since this is a corollary to the argument that
the Ninth Circuit burdened the MSMA's free exercise rights by ignoring the Free
Exercise Clause, it warrants exploration as to where the MSMA falls in the continuum
of free exercise victims.
a. From Sherbert to Boernes
At the height of sensitivity for free exercise rights, the Court held that a law was
constitutionally invalid even if the burden on the individual's free exercise prerogative
was characterized as indirect.165 In Sherbert v. Verner, the plaintiff was fired from
her employment because she refused to work on Saturdays due to her religious con-
victions as a Seventh-day Adventist.'66 Despite the termination, the issue in the case
159 EVANS, supra note 154, at 183.
'60 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(holding that a city ordinance banning animal sacrifice was not religiously neutral and the city
did not meet its burden under strict scrutiny).
161 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevent a state from compelling Amish parents to send their children to high
school); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding an individual cannot be denied un-
employment benefits after refusing employment because of her religious beliefs).
162 COOKSON, supra note 107, at 28-29.
163 EvANs, supra note 154, at 182.
164 id.
165 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
I6 d. at 399. Seventh-day Adventist focus a particular importance on Saturdays.
The seventh day (Saturday) is an extra-special part of the relationship.
The Bible, from Genesis through Revelation, describes the seventh day
as the one day God has set aside for focused fellowship with His people.
God has named that day "Sabbath" and asked us to spend it with Him.
"Remember the sabbath day," He says, "to keep it holy." The Sabbath is
a whole day to deepen our friendship with the Creator of the universe!
A day when we're together, Jesus with us and us with Jesus.
Seventh-day Adventist Church, What Adventists Believe, http://www.adventist.org/beliefs/
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was whether she was entitled to South Carolina unemployment compensation bene-
fits even if she could find employment, but refused to take it because it would require
Saturday work.' 67 In his opinion, Justice Brennan held that "[g]overnmental imposi-
tion of such a choice [whether to work on Saturday] puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her
Saturday worship. ' 68 In order to justify such a burden, the state would have to show
"the gravest abuses, endangering paramount [state] interests."'69
Nine years later, the Court likewise sided with Wisconsin Amish families who
sought to remove their children from high school prior to the age of sixteen in contra-
vention of state law. 70 The parents claimed that exposure to traditional high schools
would "endanger their own salvation and that of their children."'' 71 The Court rec-
ognized the families' free exercise rights and created a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the religious adherent in upholding the compelling state interest standard
of Sherbert. 17
2
By 1990, however, the high water for free exercise rights had receded. That year,
in the case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,173 the Court abandoned the compelling state interest standard in favor of a far
less protective process of deciding free exercise cases.'74 Smith involved the sacra-
mental use of peyote by members of a Native American church who were terminated
for job-related misconduct and denied unemployment compensation benefits as a
result.175 In his opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the principle that religiously neutral
laws required a compelling state interest in order to withstand scrutiny under the
Free Exercise Clause. 76 Instead, the Court declared that the First Amendment was
offended only when religious practice was specifically targeted for unfavorable treat-
ment. 77 Although this decision greatly narrowed the availability of the free exercise
claim, it would not be long before the doctrine was confronted head-on.
Not long after Smith, in a unanimous decision, the Court held that the City of
Hialeah, Florida, had violated the free exercise rights of the Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye when it passed a city ordinance banning ritual animal sacrifice. 178 In par
(last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
167 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
168 Id. at 404.
169 Id. at 406.
170 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"'1 Id. at 209.
172 COOKSON, supra note 107, at 30.
173 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
174 COOKSON, supra note 107, at 34.
17' Id. at 33.
176 EVANS, supra note 154, at 223.
177 Id.
178 COOKSON, supra note 107, at 35. The practice of Santeria often involves the practice
of animal sacrifice: 'These form an integral part of many Santerian religious rituals. The
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ticular, the Court noted the animosity the community leveled at the church's Santeria
followers, including comments that they were in violation of everything the country
stood for. 179 Despite the Court's curtailment of protection in Smith, it was clear that
this case was a matter of specifically invidious discrimination in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause.
In the last major milestone free exercise case before Paulson, Boerne v. Flores,
the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)"8° by declaring
that Congress exceeded its power in making the RFRA applicable to the states.' 8' In
no uncertain terms, the act was a rebuff of the Court's decision in Smith, and could
have provided a potent weapon for the MSMA after the Paulson decision.182 Although
Boerne eased the "compelling state interest" standard for the federal safeguarding
of religious freedom, the effect of the decision was to leave protection of religious
exercise to the states, where state and local laws and policies could control.'83 In sum,
it appeared the soil was fertile for a free exercise claim if reviewed under the RFRA,
or even Boerne, given the Court's delegation of power to the states and local author-
ities. But even if such options were not available or conceived of at the time, the
changing composition of the Court and new outlooks on establishment and free exer-
cise were taking place which could, and may still, affect the rights of the MSMA in
the broader church-state debate.
b. Van Orden and Beyond
animal's blood is collected and offered to the Orisha. Chickens are the most common animal
used. Their sacrifice is believed to please the Saints, and to bring good luck, purification and
forgiveness of sins." ReligiousTolerance.org, Santeria, Syncretistic Caribbean Religion: Beliefs
and Practices, http://www.religioustolerance.org/santeri3.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
179 COOKSON, supra note 107, at 35.
180 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1
to -4 (2000)), invalidated in part by City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
181 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); see also COOKSON, supra note 107, at 37.
182 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2000bb, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993).
The purposes of [the act were] (1) to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to
provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is sub-
stantially burdened by government.
Id.
183 Id. Interestingly, San Diegans overwhelmingly supported the sale of the cross to the
MSMA, which suggests local decision makers might have had more of a role in the free
exercise debate. See, e.g., Paulson v. City of San Diego (Paulson I1), 294 F.3d 1124, 1126
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (referring to the seventy-six percent voter approval of Proposition
F to "SAVE THE CROSS"), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 (2003), and cert. denied, 538 U.S.
978 (2003).
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The retreat from the broad free exercise protection envisioned in Sherbert not-
withstanding, the Court once again liberalized the permissible amount of church-state
intermingling, while at the same time it muddied the waters by failing to decisively
elucidate a set of criteria." In the first of two recent, prominent religious symbol
cases, the Court ruled that the monumental display of the Ten Commandments, among
seventeen other monuments surrounding the Texas State Capitol, did not violate
the Establishment Clause, in part, because of the historical significance of the Ten
Commandments as well as the historical role the branches of government played in
acknowledging religion in American life.85 Still, in a companion case, the Court struck
down the display of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky counties' courthouses
after numerous iterations of the display failed to eliminate a manifest religious purpose
despite modifications designed to make the exhibits more inclusive of Kentucky's
"precedent legal code."'86 Although in both decisions the Court alluded to Lemon,
in neither was the test dispositive, helping to add more uncertainty to how it would
reach decisions of establishment and free exercise in the future.8 7 As Professor Smith
argues, "In these two decisions, the Court did little to clarify the law in this area...
leaving the lower courts to sort out the principles that resulted in such disparate
results regarding substantially similar displays."1 88
Still, the march of disestablishment to the point of free exercise infringement
may be halted:
[G]iven the recent changes in the Court's composition, it is pos-
sible that it may substantially redefine its religion clause juris-
prudence. In particular, the Court may reexamine the original
meaning of the Establishment Clause, adopting a more deferen-
tial approach in reviewing the constitutionality of state measures
involving religion. The Court may develop a safe harbor for those
displays of religious symbols that have longstanding historical
significance. Alternatively, it may determine that only active
measures by the government--ones that result in religious coer-
'8 See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677 (2005).
185 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 688-92.
186 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 853.
187 Id. at 859. ("Ever since Lemon v. Kurtzman summarized the three familiar consider-
ations for evaluating Establishment Clause claims, looking to whether government action
has 'a secular legislative purpose' has been a common, albeit seldom dispositive, element
of our cases." (citation omitted)); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 ("Whatever may be the fate
of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it
not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol
grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our
Nation's history.").
188 Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism After McCreary and
Van Orden, 12 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 93, 94 (2007).
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cion-violate the Establishment Clause. In any event, the scope
of permissible religious expression is only likely to expand. 1
89
Heeding the prognostication of Professor Smith may well lead to broader flexibility
in the legal calculus of allowing state-permitted expressions of religious faith. Cases
like Paulson, in which a manifest desire resides in the local population to allow
objectively neutral processes of affording expression, may yet win the day.
It is also worth expressing, however, that it is not the intent of this Note to suggest
that religious symbolism go unfettered. Indeed, there are legitimate moral concerns
regarding the externalities of such displays. For example, as Professors Gellman and
Looper-Friedman suggest, "the problem is not so much that people feel religiously
coerced or proselytized by the government, but that non-Christians are made to feel
that they are outsiders, almost second-class citizens, and not equally American."' 90
For sure, the Framers saw fit in many respects to avoid just such majoritarian
oppression and social divisiveness that religion produces.' 9' This is something with
which all courts ought to be concerned. At the same time there must be a check on
the reflexive response which calls for an absolute wall of separation. The
separationist interpretation of the religion clauses should not be used to exert a
paternalistic veto, only overcome by judicial validation. 192
CONCLUSION
Although the decisions of the federal courts in the Ninth Circuit deserve acknowl-
edgement for ending the improper, tacit endorsement of religion on state property, the
debate should continue over whether the response by the Ninth Circuit represented
an overreaction to the claims of separationists. Whereas reinforcing the wall of sepa-
ration is prudent, indeed wholly justified, in cases where a state lends its support to a
strictly sectarian purpose, cases on the margin will be ensnarled in a political and legal
debate attempting to parse the details of intent, aid, and effect.
The case of the Mt. Soledad Cross and the impact on the MSMA represent the
failure of the Ninth Circuit to comport with rulings of California law, apply equally
forceful standards of federal law, and acknowledge the implications of its overreaching
opinion on the reciprocal rights of free exercise. As was demonstrated, the California
Supreme Court has not read its own constitutional provisions (article XVI, section five
and the no preference clause) so limitedly as to forbid any amount of aid to a religious
189 Id. at 95.
'9o Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause
forReligion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665,666 (2008).
'9' Patrick M. Garry, The Democratic Aspect of the Establishment Clause: A Refutation
of the Argument that the Clause Serves to Protect Religious or Nonreligious Minorities, 59
MERCER L. REv. 595, 596 (2008).
192 Id.
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organization, nor to take a stance hostile to religion. Furthermore, federal law has
recognized that, in some cases, the wall of separation may be breached if to do other-
wise would infringe on the ability to exercise faith. A full appraisal of these circum-
stances and a retreat from the staunch Establishment Clause interpretation will ensure
the Mt. Soledad Cross stands for another ninety-five years.
